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SIXTH AMENDMENT-THE
CO-CONSPIRATOR EXEMPTION TO THE
HEARSAY RULE: THE CONFRONTATION
CLAUSE AND PRELIMINARY FACTUAL
DETERMINATIONS RELEVANT TO
FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 801(d)(2)(E)
Bourjaily v. United States, 107 S. Ct. 2775 (1987).
I.

INTRODUCTION

In Bourjaily v. United States,' the Supreme Court ruled on three
issues relating to the co-conspirator exemption to the hearsay rule
codified in Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) 2 and the admissibility of out-of-court co-conspirator hearsay statements. The Court
held, first, that under Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a), 3 preliminary
facts relevant to Rule 801(d)(2)(E) must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. Second, the Court held that when a court
makes preliminary factual determinations under Rule 801(d) (2) (E),
it can look to the hearsay statements sought to be admitted, rather
than only to independent evidence. This portion of the Court's
holding effectively overruled the "bootstrapping rule" set out in
Glasser v. United States 4 and opened the door to the admission of virtually all out-of-court hearsay statements made by unavailable coconspirators. Third, the Court held that a defendant's rights under
the confrontation clause of the sixth amendment5 are not violated
1 107 S. Ct. 2775 (1987).
2 Rule 801(d)(2)(E) states, in pertinent part: "A statement is not hearsay if... the

statement is offered against a party and is ... a statement by a coconspirator of a party
during

the

course

and

in

furtherance

of the

conspiracy."

FED.

R.

EVID.

801 (d) (2) (E) (emphasis added).
3 Rule 104(a) governs the judicial determination of preliminary questions concerning admissibility of evidence and provides: "Preliminary questions concerning... the
admissibility of evidence shall be determined by the court.... In making its determination it is not bound by the rules of evidence except those with respect to privileges."

FED. R. Evw. 104(a). The rule does not explicitly set out a standard of proof necessary
for these admissibility determinations.
4 315 U.S. 60 (1942). See infra note 32 for a discussion of the "bootstrapping rule."

5 The sixth amendment provides, in pertinent part, that "[iln all criminal prosecu-
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by admitting into evidence an unavailable co-conspirator's hearsay
statements without inquiring into the reliability of such statements.
This Note examines the majority's reasoning with respect to the
confrontation clause issue and argues that the Court improperly relied on language in Ohio v. Roberts6 to sidestep the requirement of
the confrontation clause that a co-conspirator's statement be supported by an "indicia of reliability." 7 Because a co-conspirator's
statements are presumptively unreliable and because the co-conspirator exemption from the hearsay rule is based on the theory of
agency and not on underlying guarantees of trustworthiness as are
other hearsay exceptions,8 this Note asserts that the sixth amendment requires an independent inquiry into the statement's reliability. A logical extension of this argument is that independent
evidence should establish the existence of conspiracy and a defendant's participation therein before a co-conspirator's out-of-court
declarations can be admitted. Thus, this Note concludes, first, that
the Court's holding that a court may look to a co-conspirator's hearsay statements themselves to determine the admissibility of those
statements is in error and, second, that the policies behind both
Rules 104(a) and 801(d)(2)(E) still can be satisfied by maintaining
the independent evidence requirement as it existed at common law.
II.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF BOURJAILY

In May 1984, Clarence Greathouse, an informant working for
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), arranged to sell cocaine
to Angelo Lonardo. 9 As part of the arrangement, Lonardo agreed
to find other individuals to distribute the drug. 10 As the sale date
drew near, Lonardo and Greathouse had a telephone conversation
which was recorded by the FBI." During the conversation,
Lonardo stated that he had a "gentleman friend" with questions regarding the cocaine. 12 In a subsequent recorded telephone call,
Greathouse spoke to the "friend" about the quality and price of the
drug.' 3 Greathouse and Lonardo spoke again and agreed that the
tions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to be confronted with the witnesses against
him." U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
6 448 U.S. 56 (1980). See infra notes 48-53 and accompanying text for a discussion
of the Roberts holding.
7 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65.

8 See infra notes 99-103 and accompanying text.
9 Bourjaily, 107 S. Ct. at 2778.
10 Id.
11 Id.
12 Id.
'3 Id.
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sale would take place in a pre-designated hotel parking lot.1 4
Greathouse proceeded with the transaction as planned, and FBI
agents arrested Lonardo and William John Bourjaily after Lonardo
had placed one kilogram of cocaine in Bourjaily's car. 15
The United States government charged Bourjaily with violation
of federal statutes for conspiring to distribute cocaine and also for
possession of cocaine with intent to distribute.' 6 At trial, the government introduced, over Bourjaily's objection, Lonardo's telephone statements regarding his "friend's" participation in the drug
deal.' 7 The United States District Court for the Northern District of
Ohio found that, considering both the events in the hotel parking
lot and Lonardo's statements over the phone, the government had
established by a preponderance of the evidence that a conspiracy
involving Lonardo and Bourjaily existed.' 8 The court also found
that Lonardo's statements over the telephone were made "in the
course and in furtherance of the conspiracy," and, thus, the statements satisfied the requirements of Rule 801 (d)(2) (E) and therefore
were not hearsay. 19 The court convicted Bourjaily on both counts
20
and sentenced him to fifteen years imprisonment.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit agreed
with the district court's analysis and conclusion that Lonardo's outof-court statements were admissible under the Federal Rules of Evidence and affirmed the district court's decision. 2 ' The court of appeals additionally rejected Bourjaily's claim that his inability to
cross-examine Lonardo violated his constitutional rights under the
22
confrontation clause of the sixth amendment.
14 Id. Under the scheme, Lonardo would transfer the cocaine from Greathouse's car
to that of the "friend," who would be waiting in the parking lot. Id.
15 Id. A search of Bourjaily's car by the FBI agents also revealed over $20,000 in
cash. Id.
16 Id. Bourjaily was charged with violating two statutes: 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1982),
which states that "[a]ny person who ... conspires to commit any offense defined in this
subchapter is punishable by imprisonment or fine or both which may not exceed the
maximum punishment prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the object of the attempt or conspiracy," id.; and 21 U.S.C. § 841 (1982), which states that
"[e]xcept as authorized by this title, it shall be unlawful for any person knowingly or
intentionally to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, or possess with intent to manufacture, distribute, or dispense, a controlled substance." Id.
17 107 S. Ct. at 2778.

18 Id.

19 See supra note 2 for relevant text of Rule 801(d)(2)(E).
107 S.Ct. at 2778.
21 United States v. Bourjaily, 781 F.2d 539 (6th Cir. 1986).
22 Id. at 543. See supra note 5 for relevant language of the sixth amendment.
20

SUPREME COURT REVIEW
III.
A.

[Vol. 78

THE SUPREME COURT OPINIONS

THE MAJORITY OPINION

Writing for the majority, 2 3 Chief Justice Rehnquist addressed
three basic issues connected with Rule 801 (d) (2) (E) and the admissibility of co-conspirators' statements. The opinion first examined
the admissibility of co-conspirator declarations and the standard of
proof necessary under Rule 104(a) in determining disputed preliminary factual questions relevant to Rule 801(d)(2)(E).24 Second, the
Court dealt with the issue of the proper conjunctive interpretation
of Rules 801 (d)(2)(E) and 104(a) in light of two pre-Federal Rules of
Evidence Supreme Court decisions. 25 Third, the majority confronted the question of whether, by admitting an unavailable coconspirator's out-of-court statements without inquiring into the reliability of those statements, a defendant's rights under the confron26
tation clause of the sixth amendment were violated.
1.

The Standard of Proof Question

Chief Justice Rehnquist began his analysis by stating that the
questions of whether a conspiracy existed and whether a defendant
participated therein were preliminary questions of fact which, under
Rule 104(a), are subject to resolution by the court. 27 The ChiefJustice, on the basis of prior decisions concerning admissibility determinations relating to preliminary factual questions, 2 8 concluded that
the evidentiary standard for such admissions must be established by
a preponderance of the evidence. 29 Chief Justice Rehnquist noted
that the burden of proof for preliminary factual questions was unre23 Justice White, Justice Powell, Justice Stevens, Justice O'Connor and Justice Scalia
joined in the majority opinion.
24 For the text of Rule 801 (d) (2) (E), see supra note 2. For the text of Rule 104(a), see
supra note 3. In this case, the preliminary factual questions to be decided before
Lonardo's telephone statements could be admitted were whether a conspiracy existed
and whether the defendant was part of that conspiracy. Bourjaily, 107 S. Ct. at 2778.
25 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1973); Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60
(1942). For a discussion of these decisions, see infra note 32.
26 Bouraily, 107 S. Ct. at 2782-83.
27 Id. at 2778.
28 In support of the traditional use of the preponderance of the evidence standard,
ChiefJustice Rehnquist cited Colorado v. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. 515 (1986)(preliminary
fact that custodial confessant waived rights must be proved by preponderance of the
evidence); Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984)(inevitable discovery of illegally seized
evidence must be proved to have been more likely than not); United States v. Matlock,
415 U.S. 164 (1974)(voluntariness of consent to search must be shown by preponderance of the evidence); Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 (1972)(voluntariness of confession
must be shown by preponderance of the evidence).
29 Bourlaily, 107 S.Ct. at 2779. The preponderance of the evidence standard of proof
requires that the trial court must find it "more likely than not that the technical issues
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lated to the evidentiary standard on substantive issues in criminal
and civil cases. 3 0 Therefore, the Court held that if preliminary facts
relevant to Rule 801 (d) (2) (E) are disputed, the proponent of the ev31
idence must prove them by a preponderance of the evidence.
2.

Conjunctive Interpretationof Rule 801(d)(2)(E), Rule 104(a), and
the "bootstrappingrule"

Chief Justice Rehnquist next addressed Bourjaily's contention
that the trial court may only look to independent evidence, apart
from the statements sought to be admitted, in determining the preliminary factual questions relevant to Rule 801(d)(2)(E). The majority concluded that Rule 104(a) superceded the "bootstrapping
rule" as set forth in Glasser v. United States and reaffirmed in United
States v. Nixon. 3 2 Chief Justice Rehnquist rejected Bourjaily's contention that preliminary questions of fact under Rule 801(d) (2) (E)
could not include examination of the actual statements sought to be
admitted. 33 Instead, the majority interpreted Glasser as holding that
a court must only have some independent proof of conspiracy and
that it was permissible for a court to examine the hearsay statements
in conjunction with other independent evidence to determine
and policy concerns addressed by the Federal Rules of Evidence have been afforded due
consideration." Id.
30 Id. at 2779. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970)(in criminal cases, prosecution
must prove all elements of case beyond a reasonable doubt). On substantive issues, a
proponent of evidence must prove his case on the merits beyond a reasonable doubt,
which is a much stricter standard. Id See also Colorado v. Connelly, 107 S. Ct. at 522
(1986). In a footnote to the opinion, the majority also declined to decide related issues
of the standard of proof for questions of conditional relevancy under Rule 104(b).
Bou!jaily, 107 S. Ct. at 2779 n.1.
31 107 S. Ct. at 2779 (footnote omitted).
32 The "bootstrapping rule" states that in order to admit out-of-court declarations of
a co-conspirator, there must be "proof aliunde that [the defendant] is connected with the
conspiracy. Otherwise, hearsay would lift itself by its own bootstraps to the level of
competent evidence." Glasser, 315 U.S. at 74-75 (emphasis in original)(citations omitted). Aliunde means "from another source, from elsewhere, from outside." BLACK'S
LAW DicrroNARY 68 (5th ed. 1979). In other words, there must be proof independent of
the hearsay statements sought to be admitted.
In Glasser, the defendant contended that conflicting loyalties led his attorney not to
object to statements made by one of Glasser's co-conspirators. The Court rejected the
government's argument that any objection to the statements would have been moot because they were in fact admissible. The Court then formulated the "bootstrapping
rule." Glasser, 315 U.S. at 75. In Nixon, the Court, in dicta, mentioned and reaffirmed
the independent evidence requirement set out in Glasser. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 701. The
Court stated that "[d]eclarations by one defendant may also be admissible against other
defendants upon a sufficient showing, by independent evidence, of a conspiracy among
one or more other defendants and the declarant and if the declarations at issue were in
furtherance of that conspiracy." Id. at 701 (footnote omitted).
33 Bourjaily, 107 S. Ct. at 2780.
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whether a conspiracy had been shown by a preponderance of the
34
evidence.
Although the majority conceded that the courts of appeals had
accepted overwhelmingly Bourjaily's interpretation of Glasser-that
a court may not look to the statements themselves for evidentiary
value-the majority dismissed this interpretation by determining
that the Federal Rules of Evidence now govern those evidentiary
questions. 35 The majority, therefore, held that the "plain meaning"
of Rule 104(a) indicated that the preliminary fact-finding requirements relevant to Rule 801 (d)(2) (E) did not mirror the common law
precedent which required only independent evidence of conspiracy. 3 6 Rather, a judge could look to the hearsay statements themselves to make determinations on their admissibility. 3 7 The majority
concluded that Rule 104(a) allowed a judge to consider all relevant
evidence, legislative history of the Federal Rules of Evidence
notwithstanding. 38 In reaching the conclusion that Rule 104(a) effectively overruled Glasser, the majority rejected Bourjaily's claim
39
that Congress intended to leave the "bootstrapping rule" intact.
Chief Justice Rehnquist also replied to Bourjaily's theory that
this interpretation of the co-conspirator exemption to the hearsay
rule would open the door to admissions of unreliable hearsay statements "without any credible proof of the conspiracy." 40 The Chief
Justice argued that out-of-court statements were only "presumed unreliable" and that the presumption could be rebutted by appropriate proof.4 1 The Chief Justice also asserted that "a piece of
34 Id. ChiefJustice Rehnquist did not explain what "some proofaliunde" meant. See
id.
35 Id. ChiefJustice Rehnquist stated that "[t]he question thus presented is whether
any aspect of Glasser's bootstrapping rule remains viable after the enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence." Id. At a later point in the opinion, the ChiefJustice answered
the question in the negative, stating that "[t]o the extent that Glassermeant that courts
could not look to the hearsay statements themselves for any purpose, it has clearly been
superceded by Rule 104(a)." Id. at 2782.
36 Id. at 2780.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 Id. at n.2. In reference to the Advisory Committee's Note which states that "[an
item, offered and objected to, may itself be considered in ruling on admissibility, though
not yet admitted into evidence," FED. R. EviD. 104(a) advisory committee's note, Chief
Justice Rehnquist asserted that "[w]e think this language makes plain the drafters' intent
to abolish any kind of bootstrapping rule." Bourjaily, 107 S. Ct. at 2780 n.2.
40 107 S. Ct. at 2781.
41 Id. (emphasis in original). The Chief Justice did not address the issue of what
would be sufficient proof. However, he cited Federal Rule of Evidence 803 (24) as an
example of the rebuttable presumption. Id. Rule 803 lists the hearsay exceptions in
which the availability of the declarant is immaterial. Specifically, Rule 803(24) provides:
"The following are not excluded by the hearsay rule, even though the declarant is avail-
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evidence, unreliable in isolation, may become quite probative when
corroborated by other evidence." 4 2 As a result, the majority concluded that it would not be necessary to have an absolute bar to the
consideration of hearsay declarations in the determination of preliminary issues of fact, stating that "there is no reason to believe that
courts are any less able to properly recognize the probative value of
evidence in this particular area." 43 Additionally, ChiefJustice Rehnquist pointed out that even if a party was unsuccessful in excluding a
co-conspirator's statements, he would have an opportunity at trial to
attack their probative value as they related to the substantive issues
of the case. 4 4 Therefore, the Court held that a court may examine
co-conspirator hearsay statements sought to be admitted in the making of its preliminary factual determinations relevant to Rule
801(d)(2)(E) and that, consequently, the lower court was not in error in admitting Lonardo's out-of-court statements against
45
Bourjaily.
3.

The Confrontation Clause Issue

The majority also rejected the argument that the admission of
co-conspirators' statements violated a defendant's right to cross-examine witnesses against him under the confrontation clause of the
sixth amendment. 4 6 The majority agreed with the court of appeals'
holding that the requirements under the confrontation clause were
equivalent to those of the Federal Rules of Evidence. 4 7 In turn, the
Court narrowed the holding of Ohio v. Roberts,48 in which the Court
held that the confrontation clause required the prosecution to show
the unavailability of the declarant and the "indicia of reliability" surable as a witness: . . . A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing
exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness.
FED. R. EvID. 803(24).
42 Bou~aily, 107 S. Ct. at 2781.
43 Id.
44 Id. As an example, the majority cited Federal Rule of Evidence 806, which allows
attack on the credibility of an out-of-court declarant. See id. The majority did, however,

make a point that it was not ruling on whether courts could rely solely on the statements
themselves to determine the existence of conspiracy. Rather, the Court decided only the
narrow issue of whether a court may examine the hearsay statements at all in preliminary
factual determinations under Rule 104(a). 107 S. Ct. at 2781-82.
45 Id. at 2782.
46 Id. For the text of the confrontation clause, see supra note 5. Since Lonardo had
exercised his right not to testify under the fifth amendment, Bourjaily was unable to
cross-examine him. Bourjaily, 107 S. Ct. at 2782.
47 107 S. Ct. at 2782.
48 448 U.S. 56 (1980)(case involved the prior recorded testimony of a witness who
was unproduced at trial).
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rounding the declarants statement. 4 9 In the recent case of United
States v. Inadi,50 the Court ruled that a showing of unavailability of a
co-conspirator was not required under the confrontation clause as a
condition which must be met prior to the admission of out-of-court
statements by that co-conspirator. 5 1 The Bouijaily majority also held
that an "indicia of reliability" was not mandated by the
52
Constitution.
The majority, relying on language in Roberts which said that no
independent inquiry into reliability was required if the evidence fell
"within a firmly rooted hearsay exception," concluded that co-con55
spirator statements were also included by the Roberts decision.
Citing cases dating back to 1827, Chief Justice Rehnquist declared
that the precedents "demonstrate that the coconspirator exception
to the hearsay rule is steeped in our jurisprudence" and that it has
"a long tradition of being outside the compass of the general hearsay exclusion." 5 4 Thus, the Court held that the confrontation clause
did not require an independent inquiry into the reliability of statements which satisfied Rule 801(d) (2) (E).55
B.

THE CONCURRING OPINION

In a concurring opinion, Justice Stevens provided his own interpretation of the "bootstrapping rule" set out in Glasser v. United
States.5 6 Justice Stevens agreed with the majority's ultimate conclusion that the "plain meaning" of Rule 104(a) allowed ajudge to examine any evidence, including hearsay statements sought to be
admitted, in determining preliminary questions of fact. 57 However,
Justice Stevens stated that the Glasser rule had always been one
49 Id. at 66.

50 475 U.S. 387 (1986)(case presented the Court with an opportunity to decide the
first prong of the Ohio v. Roberts rule, the availability aspect, as it concerned Rule
801(d) (2) (E)). Bourjaily's case presented the Court with the opportunity to rule on the
second requirement of Roberts, the reliability aspect, in relation to an out-of-court coconspirator's statements.
51 Id. at 395.
52 Bourjaily, 107 S. Ct. at 2783.
53 Id. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
54 Bouraily, 107 S. Ct. at 2783. The Court cites United States v. Gooding, 25 U.S 460
(12 Wheat. 1827), which was the first case adopting the agency theory of conspiracy in
the United States. Id. The Court also cited Glasser, Nixon, and Delaney v. United States,
263 U.S. 586, 590 (1924). In Delaney, the Court held that on a prosecution for conspiracy, testimony of one conspirator as to what a deceased co-conspirator had told him
during the conspiracy was admissible against a third party at the discretion of the trial
judge. Id.
55 Boujaily, 107 S.Ct. at 2783 (footnote omitted).
56 315 U.S. 60.
57

Bouraily, 107 S.Ct. at 2783 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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which did not require proof entirely by independent evidence
before out-of-court declarations could be admitted.5 8 He argued
that this interpretation of Glasser, which would require only some,
but not complete, proof aliunde, was consistent with the language of
Rule 104(a). Therefore, Justice Stevens concluded that "[i]f... the
drafters of Rule 104(a) understood the Glasser rule as I do, they had
no reason to indicate that it would be affected by the new Rule." 59
B.

THE DISSENTING OPINION

Justice Blackmun, in the dissenting opinion, 60 disagreed with
the majority on three points. First, Justice Blackmun did not agree
that the Federal Rules of Evidence superceded the common law rule
which required that preliminary questions be determined by independent evidence before a non-testifying co-conspirator's statements could be admitted. 6 1 Second, the dissent disagreed with the
majority's conclusion that allowing a co-conspirator's statements to
be considered in determining the preliminary question of the existence of a conspiracy would remedy problems of the statement's unreliability. 62 Third, Justice Blackmun asserted that the majority's
reliance on the "firmly rooted hearsay exception" rationale which
removed the requirement that a co-conspirator's statements be supported by an independent "indicia of reliability" was misplaced and,
therefore, was in violation of the demands of the confrontation
63
clause of the sixth amendment.
1.

The Federal Rules, the Common Law, and Conflict

Justice Blackmun's dissent focused first on the apparent conflict
between the common law and the Federal Rules of Evidence. Justice Blackmun primarily contended that the plain meaning of Rule
104(a), which allows a court to consider any information in making
preliminary factual determinations, should not be read without considering its legislative history and its interrelationship with Rule
801(d)(2)(E). 64 He agreed that the plain meaning of Rule 104(a)
58 Id. (Stevens,

J.,

concurring). Justice Stevens stated that "I have never been per-

suaded... that this interpretation of the Glasserrule is correct." Id. (Stevens,J., concurring). Justice Stevens subsequently discussed the more prevalent interpretation of the
common law rule requiring independent evidence. Id. at 2783-84 (Stevens, J.,
concurring).
59 Id. at 2784 (Stevens, J., concurring) (footnote omitted).
60 Justice Marshall and Justice Brennan joined in the dissent.
61 Bourjaily, 107 S. Ct. at 2784 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
62 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
63 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

64 Id. at 2785 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

924

SUPREME COURT REVIEW

[Vol. 78

could not be ignored, but he asserted that an examination of the
Rule's legislative history showed that Congress did not intend to
change the independent evidence requirement. 6 5 Justice Blackmun
deemed the Court's rigid approach to interpreting Rule 104(a) an
"easy solution" to a difficult problem. 6 6
The dissent then gave a brief history of the co-conspirator hearsay exemption which was codified in Rule 801(d) (2) (E) .67 Justice
Blackmun noted that the exemption stemmed from principles of
agency law, the concept being that all conspirators were agents of
each other.6 8 Under the approach, the dissent noted that a co-conspirator's statements had to be made " 'in furtherance of' " the conspiracy, " 'during the course of' " the conspiracy, and had to be
supported by independent evidence. 6 9 Justice Blackmun cited the
Restatement of Agency to demonstrate that the independent evidence
requirement of the co-conspirator exemption directly corresponded
to the agency concept in that "an agent's statement alone [could
' 70
not] be used to prove the existence of an agency relationship.
On the basis of this history, Justice Blackmun concluded that the coconspirator hearsay exemption differed from other common law
hearsay exceptions because it was not based upon any particular
guarantees of reliability or trustworthiness which would ensure the
truthfulness of the admitted statement. 7 1 Instead, the dissent posited that the co-conspirator exemption stemmed from an "'adversary system' " rationale; because statements made during the
65 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun stated that "[a]n examination of
the legislative history of Rule 801 (d) (2) (E)reveals that neither the drafters nor Congress
intended to transform this requirement in any way." Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
66 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
67 Id. (BlackmunJ., dissenting). For language of Rule 801(d)(2)(E), seesupra note 2.
68 Bouraily, 107 S. Ct. at 2785 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
69 Id. at 2786 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)(citing Levie, Hearsay and Conspiracy: A Reexamination of the Co-Conspirators'Exception to the Hearsay Rule, 52 MicH. L. REV. 1159, 1161
(1954)). The first requirement arose from the rationale that an agent's words could be
attributed to his principal only as long as the agent was acting within the scope of his
employment. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The second requirement accompanied the
"in furtherance" feature in that a principal was only bound by his agent's words if an
employment or business relationship was in existence in accordance with which the
agent spoke or acted. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
70 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Section 285 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
AGENCY states that
[e]vidence of a statement by an agent concerning the existence or extent of his
authority is not admissible against the principal to prove its existence or extent,
unless it appears by other evidence that the making of such statement was within the
authority of the agent or, as to persons dealing with the agent, within the apparent
authority or other power of the agent.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 285 (1957).
71 Bouijaily, 107 S.Ct. at 2786 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

1988]

CO-CONSPIRATOR EXEMPTION TO HEARSAY

925

conspiracy were really" 'vicarious admissions,' "72 a party could not
be deprived of the right to cross-examine himself or someone authorized to speak for him. 73 Additionally, the dissent noted that the
co-conspirator exemption had a necessity justification because of
the need for evidence in conspiracy prosecutions, thus permitting a
lesser concern for reliability.' 4
Although Justice Blackmun recognized that the common law
co-conspirator exemption had some guarantees of trustworthiness, 7 5 he argued that the independent evidence requirement was
understood to contribute to the reliability issue. 76 Therefore, Justice Blackmun concluded that the Federal Rules of Evidence did not
alter the common law hearsay exemption. By citing the language of
Rule 801(d)(2)(E) 7 7 and certain Advisory Committee notes, the dissent asserted that Congress intended to retain the agency rationale
and therefore did not intend to expand the scope of the common
law rule in any way. 78 Justice Blackmun reasoned that the drafters
of the Rules balanced the prosecutorial need for evidence against
the defendant's need for protection from unreliable statements,
which is a protection the independent evidence requirement
79
provided.
Justice Blackmun then considered Rules 801(d) (2) (E) and
104(a) together in an attempt to reconcile the apparent conflict in
the language of both rules. Conceding that it would be difficult to
72 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 267, at 787-88 (E.
Cleary ed. 1984)).
73 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting)(citing MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 262, at 775 (E.
Cleary ed. 1984)).
74 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
75 Id. at 2787 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citing R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO EVIDENCE 395 (2nd ed. 1982)(conspirators are likely to know who the
members of the conpiracy are and what they are doing)).
76 Id. (BlackmunJ., dissenting). Justice Blackmun stated that "[the independent evidence requirement) goes not so much to the reliability of the statement itself, as to the
reliability of the process of admitting it: a statement cannot be introduced until independent evidence shows the defendent to be a member of an existing conspiracy." Id.
(Blackmun, J., dissenting)(citing R. LEMPERT & S. SALTZBURG, A MODERN APPROACH TO
EVIDENCE 395)(emphasis in original).
77 Specifically, Justice Blackmun cites the requirements that a co-conspirator's statements be made " 'by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in furtherance of
the conspiracy.'" Bourjaily, 107 S. Ct. at 2787 (Blackmun,J., dissenting) (quoting FED. R.
EVID. 801 (d)(2)(E)).
78 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See the Advisory Committee's note pertaining to
Rule 801(d)(2)(E), which states that "[w]hile the broadened view of agency ...might
suggest wider admissibility of statements of co-conspirators, the agency theory is at best
a fiction and ought not to serve as a basis for admissibility beyond that already established." FED. R. EID. 801(d)(2)(E) advisory committee's note.
79 Bourlaily, 107 S.Ct. at 2789 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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arrive at a resolution which would satisfy the demands of both rules,
he asserted that the purposes of both could be satisfied by retaining
the independent evidence requirement for preliminary factual determinations. 8 0 As further support for the dissent's view, Justice
Blackmun demonstrated that in the decade since the Federal Rules
of Evidence were enacted, the courts of appeals had, almost uniformly, not found a conflict between the two Rules, nor had they
interpreted Rule 104(a) to eliminate the independent evidence re81
quirement as set forth in Rule 801(d)(2)(E).
2.

Reliability Safeguard Lost

The dissent's second disagreement with the Court's holding
stemmed from the majority's contention that a co-conspirator's
statement loses its unreliability when it is considered together with
other evidence of conspiracy.8 2 Justice Blackmun disagreed with the
Court that a trial judge would be able to evaluate a declarant's statements for their evidentiary worth and detect any remaining unreliability. 83 The dissent objected to the assertion that a defendant
could still protect himself by attacking the probative value of the
statement after the statement was admitted under Rule 806.84
The dissent argued that because of the presumptive unreliability of co-conspirator statements, the Advisory Committee expressly
retained the agency rationale for the hearsay exemption providing
safeguards against unreliability, including the independent evidence
requirement.8 5 Consequently, Justice Blackmun reasoned that by
allowing a statement to be considered along with other evidence in a
determination of the statement's admissibility, the statement itself
would most likely control the interpretation of whatever other evidence existed.8 6 The dissent expressed concern that a co-conspira80 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In light of the plain meaning of Rule 104(a), which
gives great freedom to the trial court, and the apparent codification in Rule 801 (d) (2) (E)
of the common law co-conspirator exception, Justice Blackmun agreed with Saltzburg
and Redden. Id. (Blackmun,J., dissenting)(referring to S.SALTZBURG & R.REDDEN, FED-

ERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 735 (4th ed. 1986)). "One relevant preliminary fac-

tual question for Rule 104(a) analysis [should] be the following: 'Whether a conspiracy
that included the declarant and the defendant against whom a statement is offered has
been demonstrated to exist on the basis of evidence independent of the declarant's hearsay
statements.'" Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting)(quoting S.SALTZBURG & R.REDDEN, FEDERAL
RULES OF EVIDENCE MANUAL 735 (4th ed. 1986))(emphasis added).

81 Id. at 2789 & n.9 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
82 Id. at 2790 (BlackmunJ., dissenting).
83 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting)(citation omitted).
84 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). For a discussion of Rule 806, see supra note 44.
85 Bourjaily, 107 S. Ct. at 2790 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
86 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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tor's statements would be relied upon heavily in cases in which the
prosecution had inadequate independent evidence of the existence
of conspiracy, thereby recreating the "bootstrapping" problem alleviated by the Glasser Court. 7 However, Justice Blackmun agreed
with the Court's reservation of the question of whether a co-conspirator's statement alone could establish the existence of a
conspiracy.8 8
3.

The Confrontation Clause Problem

Justice Blackmun also disagreed with the Court's reliance on
Ohio v. Roberts8 9 in its determination that no independent indicia of
reliability of a co-conspirator's statements were needed because the
admissibility of such statements fell within "a firmly rooted hearsay
exception." 90 He argued that Rule 801(d) (2) (E) was not a "firmly
rooted hearsay exception" because traditional hearsay exceptions
normally satisfied the reliability concerns of the confrontation
clause. 9 1 Because the co-conspirator exemption had an agencybased rationale and not a reliability basis, the dissent argued that
the central concern of the confrontation clause could not be satisfied. 92 Justice Blackmun posited that the "firmly rooted" language
dealt with courts' experience in the use of an exception and
whether, in past experience, the exception had proven to promote
accuracy in the fact-finding process. 9 3 Justice Blackmun stated that
the majority's analysis was inconsistent and contended that if the
term "firmly rooted" indicated an underlying "indicia of reliability,"
the removal of one of the indicia of the co-conspirator exemption,
namely, the independent evidence requirement, would undermine
the firmly rooted status of the exemption.9 4 Thus, the dissent ar87 Id. at 2790-91 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun stated: "Thus, the
Court removes one reliability safeguard from an exemption, even though the situation
in which a co-conspirator's statement will be used to resolve the preliminary factual
questions is that in which the court will rely most on the statement." Id. (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting) (emphasis in original). See supra note 32 for the definition of the "bootstrapping rule."
88 Id. at 2791 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
89 448 U.S. 56 (1980).
90 Bou!jaily, 107 S. Ct. at 2791 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)(citations omitted). In Roberts, the Court stated that in confrontation clause issues, "[r]eliability can be inferred
without more in a case where the evidence falls within a firmly rooted hearsay exception." 448 U.S. at 66.
91 Bouraily, 107 S.Ct. at 2791 (Blackmun,J., dissenting).
92 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). In Roberts, the concern was stated as being "the
accuracy in the fact-finding process that cross-examination normally serves." 448 U.S.
at 66.
93 Bouraily, 107 S.Ct. at 2792 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
94 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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gued that the Court's reliance on the language in Roberts was misplaced in that it could not alter the traditional co-conspirator
exemption and simultaneously avoid confrontation clause concerns. 95 Justice Blackmun stated that the pertinent language in Roberts followed the text quoted by the Court: " 'In other cases [where
there is no firmly rooted hearsay exception], the evidence must be
excluded, at least absent a showing of particularized guarantees of
trustworthiness.' "96
IV.

ANALYSIS

A close examination of the majority opinion in Bourjaily, particularly the confrontation clause analysis, creates the impression that
the resolution of the conflict between the common law, Federal
Rules 104(a) and 801 (d) (2) (E), and the sixth amendment, is superficial. The Court concluded that under Rule 104(a), a co-conspirator's statements could be examined in making preliminary factual
determinations pertaining to Rule 801(d)(2)(E) without first establishing the fact that a conspiracy existed by evidence independent of
the statements sought to be admitted.9 7 The Court also determined
that the co-conspirator exemption from the hearsay rule was a
"firmly rooted hearsay exception" which, under Roberts,98 did not
constitutionally mandate an inquiry into the statement's reliability. 9 9
Even conceding that the language of Rule 104(a) supports the holding in Bourjaily, the confrontation clause issue provides a stumbling
block to the majority's analysis and reveals the largest flaw in the
opinion's reasoning. Chief Justice Rehnquist incorrectly relied on
the "firmly rooted hearsay exception" language. By categorizing
the exemption as "firmly rooted," the majority conveniently sidestepped the demand of the confrontation clause that a co-conspirator's statement be supported by an "indicia of reliability."
The key inconsistency was the Court's use of the word "exception" instead of "exemption," the latter of which was what the Federal Rules deemed co-conspirator statements. 10 0 It was through this
95 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
96 Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting)(quoting Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66). Justice Blackmun

also suggested that the confrontation clause might require a particularized reliability
analysis in cases in which the prosecution is trying to use co-conspirator statements for
the bulk of its case before such statements could be admitted. Id. at 2792 n. 11 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
97 Id. at 2782 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
98 Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 at 65 (1980).
99 Bouijaily, 107 S. Ct. at 2783.
100 See FED. R. EvID. 801(d) advisory committee's note, which states that "[sleveral
types of statements which would otherwise literally fall within the definition [of hearsay]
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seemingly minor word substitution that the majority was able to arrive logically at its conclusion under the sixth amendment. The error is apparent when one considers the exception/exemption
substitution that the majority used in its analysis of the constitutional issue. Reliability becomes the key factor. The fact is that the
co-conspirator exemption from the realm of hearsay was not codified under Rules 803 and 804.101 Rather, it was codified as nonhearsay. It is significant that the drafters of the Rules specifically
labeled a co-conspirator's statements as an exemption. The word
distinction is crucial to an understanding of the Rules and their underlying theories. The Advisory Committee noted that evidence
falling under a hearsay exception is admissible because of its underlying guarantees of trustworthiness. 10 2 The co-conspirator exemption, however, does not fall into that category of sufficient reliability,
10 3
even though, technically, co-conspirator statements are hearsay.
This is because the co-conspirator exemption is based on the agency
theory and not on any underlying indicia of reliability, as are the
other hearsay exceptions. 10 4 The Advisory Committee pointed out
in the note discussing Rule 801(d)(2)(E) that the basis for the Rule
are expressly excluded from it." Id. The co-conspirator exemption is listed under FED.
R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E).
101 Rule 803 sets out the list of exceptions to the hearsay rule, which are admissible
even though the declarant is available as a witness. FED. R. EviD. 803. The Advisory
Committee's note states that the rationale behind the hearsay exceptions is that "under
appropriate circumstances a hearsay statement may possess circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness sufficient to justify nonproduction of the declarant in person at the trial
even though he may be available." Id. at advisory committee's note. Rule 804 also sets
out exceptions to the hearsay rule. FED. R. EVID. 804. For the Rule 804 exceptions,
however, it is first necessary to show that the declarant is unavailable. Id. The Advisory
Committee's note to Rule 804 states that the rule proceeds on the theory that "hearsay
which admittedly is not equal in quality to testimony of the declarant on the stand may
nevertheless be admitted if the declarant is unavailable and if his statement meets a
specified standard." Id. at advisory committee's note. The notes suggest that the hearsay rule is one of preference for in-court testimony, but, if hearsay is of a particular
quality, it "is preferred over complete loss of the evidence of the declarant." Id. at advisory committee's note. Neither Rule 803 nor Rule 804 is applicable without a preliminary showing of the declarant's first-hand knowledge. See FED. R. EVID. 602. Rule 602
states that "[a] witness may not testify to a matter unless evidence is introduced sufficient to support a finding that the witness has personal knowledge of the matter ..
Id.
102 See supra text accompanying note 91.
103 "Hearsay" is defined in Rule 801 as a "statement, other than one made by the
declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to prove the truth of
the matter asserted." FED. R. EVID. 801. Thus, a non-testifying conspirator's out-ofcourt statement used against a fellow conspirator at trial or other judicial proceeding to
prove the existence of a conspiracy would fall under the technical definition of hearsay.
But see Fed. R. Evid. 801 (d)(2) (E) (co-conspirators' statements are a hearsay exemption).
104 Bouuaily, 107 S. Ct. at 2785 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Agency theory is one of
vicarious liability in which a principal is held to be responsible for the acts and words of
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was still the agency theory.1 0 5 Thus, Rule 801 (d) (2) (E) was enacted
for different reasons than Rules 803 and 804, in which the reliability
of certain types of evidence would be sufficient if cross-examination
were not possible. It follows that labeling Rule 801(d)(2)(E) as not
hearsay was an intentional differentiation between two types of hearsay evidence which have different rationales and sets of
considerations.
Realizing this distinction invalidates the majority's use of the
word "exception" in reference to Rule 801(d)(2)(E) and the Court's
10 6
reliance upon the "firmly rooted exception" language in Roberts.
The dissent correctly analyzed Roberts as basing the "firmly rooted"
requirement on reliability. Because the confrontation clause was
concerned with "accuracy in the fact finding process by ensuring the
defendant an effective means to test adverse evidence,"' 0 7 hearsay
statements were admissible only if they bore "adequate indicia of
reliability."' 1 8 If the co-conspirator exemption was not based upon
underlying reliability, the Court could not then decide that a coconspirator's statements would become a "firmly-rooted hearsay exception." In turn, such statements would not acquire reliability that
they did not possess, and an independent inquiry into the statements' trustworthiness would be required. 10 9
Consequently, Justice Rehnquist's assertion that the court of
appeals correctly held that the requirements for admission under
Rule 801(d) (2) (E) and under the confrontation clause were identihis agent while the agent is acting within the scope of his employment. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY states that

[elvidence of a statement by an agent concerning the existence or extent of his
authority is not admissible against the principal to prove its existence or extent,
unless it appears by other evidence that the making of such statement was within the
authority of the agent or ...
within the apparent authority or other power of the
agent.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 285 (1957).

105 The Advisory Committee's note states that "[w]hile the broadened view of agency
might suggest wider admissiblity of statements of co-conspirators, the agency theory
of conspiracy is at best a fiction and ought not to serve as a basis for admissibility beyond
that already established." FED. R. EVID. 801(d)(2)(E) advisory committee's note (citations omitted).
106 448 U.S. at 66 (1980).
107 Id. at 65.
108 Id. at 66 (citations omitted). It would be safe to suggest that the implication of this
statement is that the exceptions set forth in Rule 803 could pass constitutional muster
because they were based on guarantees of trustworthiness.
109 Bourjaily, 107 S. Ct. at 2792 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The majority "cannot
transform the exemption, . . . and then avoid Confrontation Clause concerns by conjuring up the 'firmly rooted hearsay exception' as some benign genie who will extricate the
Court from its inconsistent analysis." Id. (emphasis in original).
...
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cal" 10 was also in error. Authorities discussing the hearsay rule and
the confrontation clause have stated emphatically that the hearsay
rule does not exactly codify the confrontation clause. 1 1 ' This idea
also is evident in the Federal Rules of Evidence. The Advisory
Committee's note introducing the hearsay rule generally expresses
the accepted belief that the confrontation clause extends beyond the
scope of and is separate from the hearsay rule. 1 12 Thus, even
though the confrontation clause and the hearsay rule were "generally designed to protect similar values," 1 13 the clause and the rule
do not have identical standards as the majority posited; therefore,
Rule 801(d)(2)(E) is even further removed from meeting the standards of the confrontation clause by virtue of its non-hearsay status.
It follows that if Rules 803 and 804, which are reliability-based exceptions to the hearsay rule, can still be subject to the stricter standards of the confrontation clause, statements falling under Rule
801(d)(2)(E) should merit even closer scrutiny. If the purpose of
the confrontation clause is to preference face-to-face accusation and
therefore establish a "rule of necessity" 1 4 in which only hearsay
marked as trustworthy can substitute for cross-examination, then
the co-conspirator exemption cannot fit neatly under that reliability
umbrella. For constitutional purposes, an independent inquiry into
a co-conspirator statement's trustworthiness would be in order." 15
Even though the independent evidence requirement that a conspiracy be established prior to admitting a co-conspirator's statements
110 Id. at 2782.

111 In California v. Green, the Court stated that "it is quite a different thing to suggest
that the overlap is complete and that the Confrontation Clause is nothing more or less
than a codification of the rules of hearsay and their exceptions as they existed historically at common law." 399 U.S. 149, 155 (1969). See also Note, Federal Rule of Evidence
801(d)(2)(E) and the Confrontation Clause: Closing the Window of Admissibility for Coconspirator
Hearsay, 53 FORDHAM L. REV. 1291, 1294 (1985). "In most cases, the Confrontation
Clause affords the criminal defendant greater protection than the hearsay rule was intended to offer." Id. (footnote omitted).
112 FED. R. EvID. 801 advisory committee's note, introductory note: The Hearsay
Problem. The Advisory Committee's note states that "under the recent cases the impact
of the [confrontation] clause clearly extends beyond the confines of the hearsay rule."
Id. The note continues:
[i]n recognition of the separateness of the confrontation clause and the hearsay
rule, and to avoid inviting collisions between them... the exceptions set forth in
Rules 803 and 804 are stated in terms of exemption from the general exclusionary
mandate of the hearsay rule, rather than in positive terms of admissibility.
Id. The note suggests, then, that even the reliability-based hearsay exceptions could be
subject to constitutional scrutiny. See id.
113 Green, 399 U.S. at 155.
114 Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65.
115 See Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74, 88-89 (1970), for one possible reliability factor
analysis of out-of-court hearsay statements.
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does not go to the reliability of the statement itself, the dissent is
intuitively correct in its assertion that by taking away the independent evidence requirement under Rule 801(d) (2) (E), one of the few
safeguards against unreliability that the exemption possesses is
lost.1 16 As a result, the "bootstrapping" problem is recreated. It is
realistic to believe that by opening the door to the "bootstrapping"
possibility by allowing co-conspirators' statements to be considered
in their own admissibility determinations, a judge will likely give
more weight to the hearsay statements, will bolster otherwise weak
independent evidence, and, thus, will admit the statements at trial.
In turn, such admissions will most likely lead to convictions.
The confrontation clause analysis in Bouijaily directly conflicts
with the Court's holding as to the conjunctive interpretation of
Rules 104(a) and 801(d)(2)(E). t 17 Ultimately, the Constitution
should take precedence over evidentiary rules. It is necessary for a
defendant to be able to confront witnesses against him. Thus, public policy supports a conjunctive interpretation of both Rules as allowing a judge to consider any relevant evidence in the making of
preliminary factual determinations prior to the admission of a coconspirator's statements related to Rule 801(d)(2)(E); however, this
process should not apply to the hearsay statements sought to be admitted. The co-conspirator's statements should first be subject to a
reliability test or, alternatively, independent evidence should be required to establish the existence of the conspiracy so that the statements themselves are not the basis for a conspiracy conviction once
they are presented to the jury.
Though the Court's holding seems to be supported by the plain
language of Rule 104(a) and by the fact that Congress enacted the
Federal Rules of Evidence subsequent to the "bootstrapping rule"
decision set out in Glasser,'1 8 the holding in Bourjaily is inconsistent.
The majority reasoned that regardless of the rule laid down by those
cases, the Federal Rules superceded the common law. 11 9 The ma116 See Bourjaily, 107 S. Ct. at 2792 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
117 The Court's interpretation removed the independent evidence of conspiracy,
which at common law was required before a co-conspirator's statement could be admitted. Id. at 2782.
118 315 U.S. 60. See supra note 32, which sets out the bootstrapping rule. Congress
enacted the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975, and Glasserwas decided in 1941. The
decision reaffirming the bootstrapping rule, United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, was
decided in 1973.
119 Bouraily, 107 S. Ct. at 2780. The majority agreed that the Glasser and Nixon decisions could be interpreted as requiring a showing of independent evidence of a conspiracy before a co-conspirator's statements could be admitted and acknowledged that the
courts of appeals have generally interpreted those decisions as holding such. Id. Chief
Justice Rehnquist wrote that
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jority, however, too broadly interpreted Rule 104(a) and its accompanying Advisory Committee's note, in stating that the language
was clear that the drafters intended to abolish the "bootstrapping
rule" through Rule 104(a).1 20 It is not a plausible reading of the
Advisory Committee's note to Rule 104(a) that the drafters intended
to specifically abolish the "bootstrapping rule" as it related to Rule
801 (d)(2) (E). The drafters simply set up a general rule dealing with
preliminary issues that would be triggered by the other, more specific rules, not only Rule 801(d)(2)(E). 12 1 The purpose of Rule
104(a) is to allow a judge to efficiently resolve preliminary matters
without being constrained by exclusionary principles. 2 2 The dissent correctly asserted that each Rule cannot be read in isolation,
because the Rules are all interrelated and must be interpreted in the
context of each other.' 23 When one has two Rules to interpret and
apply simultaneously, as in Bouraily, the policies behind each one
[r]ead in the light most favorable to petitioner, Glasser could mean that a court
should not consider hearsay statements at all in determining preliminary facts
under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) ....
The Courts of Appeals have widely adopted [this]
view and held that in determining the preliminary facts relevant to co-conspirators'
out-of-court statements, a court may not look at the hearsay statements themselves
for their evidentiary value.
Id.
Chief Justice Rehnquist also posed the theory that no conflict actually existed between Glasserand the Federal Rules if one interpreted Glasser less stringently. The Chief
Justice stated that "Glasser, however, could also mean that a court must have some proof
aliunde, but may look at the hearsay statements themselves in light of this independent
evidence to determine whether a conspiracy has been shown by a preponderance of the
evidence." Id. (emphasis in original). The latter interpretation goes against the plain
language of the "bootstrapping rule" because "proof aliunde" literally means evidence
"from another source; from elsewhere, from outside." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 68 (5th
ed. 1979).
120 In citing the Advisory Committee, ChiefJustice Rehnquist asserted that "this language makes plain the drafters' intent to abolish any kind of bootstrapping rule. Silence
is at best ambiguous, and we decline the invitation to rely on speculation to import
ambiguity into what is otherwise a clear rule." Bouraily, 107 S. Ct. at 2781 n.2.
121 See generally FED. R. EviD. 104 advisory committee's note.
122 The Advisory Committee queried that "'[slhould the exclusionary law of evidence, "the child of the jury system" in Thayer's phrase, be applied to this hearing
before the judge? Sound sense backs the view that it should not, and that the judge
should be empowered to hear any relevant evidence, such as affidavits or other reliable
hearsay.'" FED. R. EvID. 104 advisory committee's note (quoting MCCORMICK ON EvIDENCE § 53 n.8, at 123)(emphasis added). It is interesting to note that this quote specifically mentions reliability in its example of what relevant evidence a judge should view.
This quote from the Advisory Committee's note supports the interpretation that coconspirators' statements should not be viewed by a judge, even though relevant, because of inherent unreliability of the statements. See id.
123 Boujaily, 107 S. Ct. at 2785 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). The dissent cited Cleary,
Preliminary Notes on Reading the Rules of Evidence, 57 NEB. L. REv. 908, 908 (1978)("the
answers to all questions that may arise under the Rules may not be found in specific
terms in the Rules"). 107 S. Ct. at 2785. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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have to be considered and dealt with. It was unreasonable for the
Court to separate Rule 104(a) from the language of Rule
801(d)(2)(E), the latter of which codified the common law and specifically retained the underlying agency rationale.
At common law, the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay
rule had generally been supported by a theory similar to that of
agency. A conspiracy was viewed as a relationship of mutual agency
with statements made by one conspirator treated as vicarious admissions of the other conspirators. 12 4 By definition, a conspiracy means
that two or more persons agreed to do an illegal act or to do a legal
act in an illegal manner. 12 5 Because the conspiracy was a common
undertaking, all of the conspirators were theoretically "agents" of
each other, so that acts and statements of one could be attributed to
12 6
the other.
Another rationale underlying the co-conspirator exception is
the necessity theory.' 2 7 Because conspiracies are necessarily secretive operations, which, for the most part, are geared towards the
commission of some of the worst types of crimes, the co-conspirator
exemption was created to give prosecutors greater freedom in prosecuting conspirators. 12 8 Also, without admitting into evidence the
co-conspirators' out-of-court statements, conspiracies would be dif29
ficult to prove at trial.'
Nevertheless, the exception consisted of three elements which
had to be met before co-conspirator hearsay statements were admitted. Each element reflected an agency basis.' 3 0 A co-conspirator's
statement had to be made "during the course or pendency" and "in
furtherance of" the conspiracy's objective, and, before a statement
could be admitted, it had to be supported by evidence independent
13 1
of the conspiracy and of the defendant's participation therein.
124 Davenport, The Confrontation Clause and the Co-ConspiratorException in Criminal Prosecutions: A FunctionalAnalysis, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1378, 1384 (1972). Agency is defined as
"the fiduciary relation which results from the manifestation of consent by one person to
another that the other shall act on his behalf and subject to his control, and consent by
the other so to act ....
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1 (1957).
125 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE, § 427 (1980).
126 Id.

127 Davenport, supra note 124, at 1384-85.
128 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, supra note 125. In light of the necessity rationale behind the co-conspirator exemption from the realm of hearsay of Rule 801(d)(2)(E) and
Rule 104(a)'s efficiency basis, the two rules are compatible in that both serve to expedite
the trial process.
129 Note, supra note 111, at 1291.
130 Bourlaily, 107 S. Ct. at 2786 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
131 Davenport, supra note 124, at 1385 (emphases in original). The "during the
course" requirement arose from the agency idea that the agent's words could only be
attributed to his principal if the agent was acting while in a business or employment
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Rule 801(d)(2)(E), which codified the common law, specifically retained the agency basis. The existence of the agency basis is evident
in the Rule's language: "a statement is not hearsay if ... [it] is a
statement by a coconspirator of a party during the course and in
furtherance of the conspiracy."1 32 By implication, a preliminary fact
to be determined before the Rule would become applicable is
whether a conspiracy existed and whether the defendant participated in that conspiracy. Although the independent evidence requirement was not explicitly set forth in the Rule, it is a most
plausible interpretation, in light of the non-reliability basis for the
Rule, that the conspiracy would first have to be established before a
hearsay statement could be considered.' 33 In fact, the Advisory
Committee expressly asserted that the co-conspirator exemption
under Rule 801(d)(2)(E) should not "serve as a basis for admissibility beyond that already established,"' 1 34 thus giving support to the
conclusion that under the Rule, the common law requirements for
admissibility, including the independent evidence requirement,
were intended to be left intact.
This interpretation of the co-conspirator exemption under Rule
801(d)(2)(E) does not conflict with that of Rule 104(a). A judge is
still able to hear all other relevant evidence to determine the existence of a conspiracy. Indeed, one authority mentions that because
the amount of independent evidence required to establish the fact
of conspiracy is so slight, a prosecutor would still be able to get the
statements into evidence the majority of the time.1 3 5 Yet, even if
there is a great public desire to convict conspirators, this desire cannot allow a defendant's confrontation rights to be affected by allowing unreliable out-of-court hearsay statements to be used to
determine the statements' admissibility. In light of the confrontation clause, the independent evidence requirement, which is an inrelationship with his prinicipal. Bourjaily, 107 S. Ct. at 2786 (Blackmun, J., dissenting)(citations omitted). The "in furtherance" requirement is considered a qualification
of the pendency requirement in which "a statement cannot strictly be in furtherance of a
conspiracy without being made during the conspiracy's pendency." Davenport supra
note 124, at 1387. Thus, the agency rationale behind this requirement was that an
agent's acts or words could be attributed to his principal if the agent was acting within
the scope of his employment. The final component, the independent evidence requirement, was based on the agency principle that "an agent's statement cannot be used
alone to prove the existence of the agency relationship." Boujaily, 107 S. Ct. at 2786
(Blackmun, J., dissenting).
132 FED. R. EvID. 801 (d)(2)(E).
133 See supra notes 101-05 and accompanying text.
134 See FED. R. Evw. 801(d)(2)(E) advisory committee's note.
135 Davenport, supra note 124, at 1388.
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herent protective safeguard for a defendant, should not be pushed
aside on expediency grounds.
V.

CONCLUSION

The sixth amendment provides that a defendant is entitled to
confront witnesses against him. When an adverse witness is unavailable to testify and the prosecution tries to admit co-conspirator
hearsay statements to prove the existence of the conspiracy, the
confrontation clause demands that the statements be subject to an
independent inquiry as to their reliability. Because out-of-court coconspirator statements have never been admitted on a reliability basis, but rather on an agency theory, the Supreme Court in Bourjaily
made a grave error in holding that the co-conspirator exemption
from the realm of hearsay evidence was such a "firmly rooted hearsay exception" that an inquiry into the trustworthiness of the coconspirators' hearsay declarations was not required. The independent evidence requirement as maintained in the Federal Rules of Evidence constitutes one safeguard against unreliability that the coconspirator exemption possessed. The removal of that requirement
by the Bourjaily Court directly conflicts with the demands of the confrontation clause and counters the intent of the drafters of the Rules
in their retaining of the agency basis for the co-conspirator exemption. The "plain meaning" of Rule 104(a) notwithstanding, maintaining the independent evidence requirement under Rule
801(d) (2) (E) is necessary to protect a defendant's rights under the
sixth amendment if he is not able to cross-examine an adverse
witness.
JULIE HANUSA

